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Abstract. Third-party apps enable a personalized experience on so-
cial networking platforms; however, they give rise to privacy interdepen-
dence issues. Apps installed by a user’s friends can collect and potentially
misuse her personal data inflicting collateral damage on the user while
leaving her without proper means of control. In this paper, we present
a multi-faceted study on the collateral information collection of apps in
social networks. We conduct a user survey and show that Facebook users
are concerned about this issue and the lack of mechanisms to control it.
Based on real data, we compute the likelihood of collateral information
collection affecting users; we show that the probability is significant and
depends on both the friendship network and the popularity of the app.
We also show its significance by computing the proportion of exposed
user attributes including the case of profiling, when several apps are
offered by the same provider. Finally, we propose a privacy dashboard
concept enabling users to control the collateral damage.
1 Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become a dominant platform for
people to express themselves, interact with each other and get their
daily entertainment. By design and popularity, Facebook has morphed
into a massive information repository storing users’ personal data and
logging their interaction with friends, group, events, and pages. The
sheer amount and potentially sensitive nature of such data have raised
a plethora of privacy issues for Facebook users, such as the lack of user
awareness, cumbersome privacy controls, accidental information disclo-
sure, unwanted stalking, and reconstruction of users identities, see Wang
et al. [21].
Applications, providers, permissions, and control. Complicating
the Facebook privacy landscape, users can also enjoy apps for a person-
alized social experience. Apps can be developed either by Facebook itself
or by third-party app Providers (appPs). Facebook relies on permission-
based platform security and applies the least privilege principle to third-
party apps. For installation and operation, each app requests from the
user a set of permissions, granting the app the right to access and collect
additional information (steps 1 to 4 in Fig. 1.a). After the user’s ap-
proval, apps can collect the user’s personal data and store it on servers
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Fig. 1: a. Facebook app architecture, b. Collateral information collection
outside Facebook’s ecosystem and completely out of the user’s control
(steps 5 to 6).
Initially, Facebook enabled apps to collect profile attributes of users’
friends by assigning separate permissions to each profile attribute. Later,
Facebook has replaced this with a single permission to conform with US
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations on data collection [3]. Con-
formity notwithstanding, apps are still able to collect up to fourteen pro-
file attributes via friends [18]. Of course, users have app-related privacy
controls at their disposal; however, they are scattered at multiple loca-
tions, such as the user’s personal profile (visibility levels per attribute) or
the apps menu (attributes friends can bring with them to apps). Taking
into account that default settings are very much pro-sharing, fragmented
and sometimes curiously worded, privacy control settings could promote
incorrectly set policies or complete neglect from users [21].
Privacy interdependence, profiling, and legislation. The subop-
timal privacy controls and the server-to-server (and potentially oﬄine)
communication between Facebook and appP make any protection mecha-
nism hard to apply [8]. As a result, the user’s profile items can be arbitrar-
ily retrieved by an appP without automatic notification or on-demand
approval by the user through friends. Since the privacy of an individual
user is affected by the decisions of other users (being partly out of their
control), this phenomenon is referred to as privacy interdependence [6].
From an economic point of view, sharing a user’s information without her
direct consent can lead to the emergence of externalities. While sharing
someone else’s information may yield benefits for her (positive external-
ity, e.g., personalized experience in social apps), it is also almost certain
to cause a decrease in her utility (negative externality, e.g., exposed pro-
file items). Existing research is limited to pointing out the existence of
and risks stemming from such negative externalities in the Facebook app
ecosystem [6], and its potential impact on app adoption [15, 16].
Neglected by previous work, third party appPs can be owners of sev-
eral apps (e.g., appP1 offers app A1, A2, A3 and A4, see Fig. 1.b). For
instance, Vipo Komunikacijos and Telaxo are appPs offering 163 and
130 apps, among those 99 and 118 with more than 10, 000 monthly ac-
tive users, respectively (extracted from the Appinspect dataset [5]). As
a consequence, an appP may cluster several apps and thus get access to
more profile items. Moreover, every app retrieves the Facebook user ID
that uniquely identifies a user over apps; hence, the appP could build
a combined full profile of the user. We refer to this process as profiling,
analogously to the term used in the context of consumer behavior in mar-
keting [12]. However, with the help of apps installed by a user’s friends,
appPs could profile a user partly or entirely without her consent, which
constitutes a privacy breach, and could induce legal consequences.
From the legal point of view, both the European Data Protection Di-
rective [2] and the guidelines of FTC [3] require prior user consent for
the collection and usage of personal data by data controllers (i.e., Face-
book or appPs). According to FTC, apps cannot imply indirect consent
through privacy settings; while the European Commission requires trans-
parency and fairness from the data controller about the nature, amount,
and aim of data collection: this requirement is not met here with data
processing potentially going beyond the users’ legitimate expectation.
Motivated by the above privacy issues of Facebook apps we define as
collateral damage the privacy loss inflicted by the acquisition of users’
personal data by apps installed by users’ friends, and by appPs offering
multiple apps thereby enabling user profiling.
Contribution. We have identified four research questions to further our
understanding of indirect and collateral information collection in the case
of Facebook apps.
– Are the users aware of and concerned about their friends being able
to share their personal data? We conducted an online survey of 114
participants, to identify the users’ views on collateral information
collection, lack of notification and not being asked for their approval.
Our survey provides evidence that participants are very concerned
and their concern is bidirectional: the large majority of users wants
to be notified and potentially restrict apps’ access to profile items
both when their friends might leak information about them and vice
versa.
– What is the likelihood that an installed app enables the collateral
information collection? We develop a formula to estimate the prob-
ability of this event. We show how the likelihood depends on the
number of friends and the number of active users of apps. More-
over, based on results obtained from simulations, we show how the
likelihood depends on specific network topologies and app adoption
models.
– How significant is the collateral damage? We develop a mathemat-
ical model and quantify the proportion of user attributes collected
by apps installed only by the user’s friends, including the case of
profiling, when several apps belong to the same appP. We compute
the significance on several snapshots of the most popular Facebook
apps using the Appinspect dataset [5].
– How can we raise user awareness and help them make informed de-
cisions? For this end, we discuss a dashboard that enhances trans-
parency by providing an overview of installed apps and the type
and total amount of profile attributes collected by apps and, more
importantly, appPs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the user
survey. Section 3 presents the mathematical model of collateral damage
and calculates the likelihood of a user being affected by collateral infor-
mation collection. Section 4 extends the model and quantifies collateral
information collection illustrated by a case study of popular apps. Sec-
tion 5 presents the high-level design for a privacy dashboard providing
users with proper notifications and control. Section 6 describes future
work and concludes the paper.
2 User survey
In this section, we tackle the research question: “are users concerned
about collateral information collection?” To answer this question, we
conducted an online survey investigating users’ views about the disclo-
sure of personal data by Facebook apps installed by the users’ friends,
and to identify users’ concerns about unconsented information collection
on Facebook; 114 participants answered the survey. Participants were
recruited from the authors’ direct and extended friend circles (includ-
ing mostly, but not only, Facebook friends). Hence, a large proportion
of participants have an age between 20 and 35 and are well educated.
We found that users are concerned about collateral information collec-
tion in general, and remarkably concerned when information collection
is unconsented. Furthermore, the majority of users prefer to take action
to prevent collateral information collection. We have to stress that our
survey provides us with evidence that users are concerned about the in-
formation collection of apps through their users’ friends. However, we are
not able to extrapolate our findings to the general Facebook population.
2.1 Methodology
After a short introduction, our survey consisted of four main parts. First,
we assessed users’ standpoints and concerns about default privacy set-
tings and the lack of notification for indirect and unconsented informa-
tion collection. This assessment is necessary to be able to differentiate
users who are concerned independent of their intentions to take actions
against such practices. The second part of the survey explores what type
of personal data on Facebook users find most sensitive. The third part
of our survey is twofold: 1) whether users want to be notified when their
friends’ apps can collect their personal data or when their installed apps
can collect personal data of their friends; 2) which actions users prefer to
take in such cases. Users replied the survey questions by marking their
responses on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 stands for “not concerned at all
and 5 stands for “extremely concerned”; we also provided a text field
where necessary. The fourth part of the survey collects demographics
and information regarding the participants’ use of Facebook apps.
2.2 Results
For the first part, we observe that for all four statements users show
concern (see Fig. 2). For example, 66% of users are at least very con-
cerned about the default privacy setting of Facebook that allows apps to
collect information from the user’s friends. Similarly, 77% of users are at
least very concerned about not being notified when their friends enable
collateral information collection and 67% for not being notified when
one of the user’s own apps can collect their friends’ information. Finally,
81% of users are at least very concerned about collateral information col-
lection through apps of their friends without their approval. Note that
Golbeck et al. [10] have investigated how informed users are regarding
the privacy risks of using Facebook apps. Their findings show that users
do not always comprehend what type of data is collected by apps even
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Fig. 2: Results for the first part of the survey where we asked participants about
their opinions on four statements regarding default settings, lack of notification
(for friends and for the user herself), and lack of consent for collateral informa-
tion collection (CIC).
when they have installed the app themselves. Therefore, it is safe to as-
sume incomplete understanding of apps installed by their friends, which
is in line with our results. Note that in Fig. 2, there is a slight difference
between participants opinion on statement B on the one hand and state-
ments C and D on the other hand for users which are not concerned.
This difference might be because statement B is directly related to the
users’ information loss. Moreover, statement B would burden the user
less than C and D, where action by the users is required.
For the second part of our survey, we found that although users are
concerned about a number of attributes, the sensitivity is relatively sub-
jective and differs between users. However, it is noteworthy that cer-
tain attributes are standing out and have been marked as sensitive by
a large proportion of the participants. For example, most of the users
identify photos (84% are at least very concerned), videos (79%), their
current location (76%), and family and relationships (54%) as sensitive
profile attributes. The least sensitive profile attributes are proved to be
to be birthday and sexual orientation. Note that the sensitivity of the
attributes is likely to depend on the context. For example, although a
birthday attribute might seem harmless on its own, participants might
feel different if a weather app would be collecting this information.
In the third part of the survey, we found that 77% of users always want
to be notified when friends’ apps can collect their personal data, 22%
only want to be notified in particular cases, while only about 1% do not
want to be notified at all. Moreover, 69% of users always want to be
notified when their apps are collecting information from their friends,
27% in particular cases, and only about 1% not at all. We observe that
users are also seriously concerned about damaging their friends’ privacy:
this corroborates findings on other-regarding preferences from the lit-
erature [7, 17]. Notification tools can be very useful to enhance privacy
awareness for unconsented data collection. Note that Golbeck et al. have
shown that the privacy awareness of users can be changed significantly
through educational methods [10]. When participants were asked which
action they would want to take if notified that friends’ apps are about to
collect their information (multiple answers allowed), 99 out of 114 par-
ticipants answered that they would restrict access to their personal data
while 8 participants answered that they would unfriend their Facebook
friend. Only 5 participants answered that they would take no action.
We have to stress that the reaction of a user may strongly depend on
the relationship between the user and their friends. When participants
were asked what action they would want to take if they are notified that
one of their apps is about to collect their friends’ information (multiple
answers allowed), 64 out of 114 replied that they would restrict access
to their friends’ personal information for this app. Only 5 out of 114 an-
swered that they would take no action. The answers to the questions in
the third part help to confirm that the answers of our participants in the
first part were not due to salience bias; participants who were concerned
in the first part about not being notified for the collateral information
collection replied that they also want to take an action in the third part.
The last part of our survey collected demographics and statistics about
Facebook and app usage. Participants were between 16 and 53 years old
with an average age of 29 years. They have had their Facebook accounts
for between 6 months and 10 years, respectively. Moreover, 69% of our
participants have installed an app at least once, and among those 87%
have installed 1 or 2 apps in the last six months. 54% of the participants
were female, 42% male while 4% preferred not to disclose their gender.
Participants varied greatly in their number of friends, from 10 to 1000.
51% changed their privacy settings on Facebook; 79% restricted who
could see their profile information, 41% who could see them in searches,
and 35% who can collect their information through friends apps (multi-
ple answers were allowed). Interestingly, users who already took an ac-
tion by restricting their permissions to their friends apps by 90% choose
to be notified too. One explanation could be that privacy settings on
Facebook are constantly changing and tracking these changes might be
cumbersome [21]. Furthermore, 82% of our participants had higher ed-
ucation, where 55% had IT background based on personal interest and
44% through higher education. We conclude from our survey that users
are concerned about the collateral information collection, and prefer be-
ing notified and try to prevent such type of information collection.4
3 Likelihood of Collateral Information
Collection
In this section, we investigate the likelihood of a user’s friend installing
an app which enables collateral information collection. We build a simple
mathematical model and develop a formula to estimate the probability
this event occurs. Then, we present case studies taking into account dif-
ferent friendship network topologies and app adoption models. Further-
more, we use the Appinspect dataset [5] to instantiate our estimations,
and resort to simulations for computing the probability for different net-
work types.
Let an Online Social Network (OSN) with k users and the corresponding
set be denoted by the set F , i.e., F = {u1, . . . , uk}. The user is denoted
by u, with u ∈ F . Let f be a friend of u and Fu the set of u’s friends,
i.e., f ∈ Fu. Clearly, Fu ⊆ F . Moreover, let Aj an app and L the set of
all Ajs that are offered by the OSN to every ui, and s the size of the set,
i.e., L = {A1, . . . , As}. Moreover, let AUj be the number of users who
have installed Aj . For our likelihood estimation we consider the number
of Monthly Active Users (MAU) to represent the number of active users.
For instance, currently Facebook has k = 1.3×109 users (i.e., MAU) [20]
and more than s = 25, 000 Apps [5].
4 http://http://iraklissymeonidis.info/survey.
To estimate the likelihood that u’s personal data can be collected via the
Aj , installed by f , we compute the probability of at least an arbitrary f
installing any available Aj . Let Q
f be the probability of f installing Aj
which enables collateral information collection. For all the friends of u
(i.e., Fu) the probability of not installing any Aj is the product of proba-
bilities for each f (this assumes that these probabilities are independent,
which seems a reasonable approximation). Let Ω be the probability of
at least one of u’s friends installing Aj (regardless if u has installed Aj),
i.e.,
Ω = 1−
∏
f∈Fu
(1−Qf ) . (1)
First, we compute the likelihood Ω when the probability for a friend of
the user installing an app is uniformly distributed among all friends.
Case study 1 – uniform distribution. Each f decides whether to in-
stall Aj without considering any app adoption signals from other users.
The probability of at least a friend of u installing Aj is uniformly dis-
tributed among u’s friends, and equals 1−Q (Remark: Q = Qf1 = · · · =
Qfk′ where 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k). Q is then computed as all users who installed
the app divided by the number of users of the OSN (in the active user
sense):
Q =
AUj
|F| . (2)
We used the publicly available Appinspect dataset provided by Hubert
et al. [11, 5] to extract the range of MAU of apps which enable collateral
information collection. The dataset consists of 16, 808 Facebook apps
between 2012 and 2014. It contains the application name, id, number of
active users (daily, weekly and monthly) and the requested permissions.
To illustrate the influence of different values of MAUs on Ω, we consider
the upper tier of apps, i.e., over 500, 000 MAU, while the most popular
app that collects friends’ data has 10, 000, 000 MAU, therefore 5 · 105 ≤
AUj ≤ 1 · 107. To cover most users, we assume the number of friends
for a given u (|Fu|) to be between 0 and 1000. Finally, we estimate the
population of Facebook to be 1.1 · 109 MAU for the period of 2012 to
2014 [20].
For Ajs with AUj ≥ 5 · 106 the probability Ω grows steeply with the
average number of friends (see Fig. 3.a). For an average of 200 friends
the probability Ω is more than 0.6. For a user with 300 friends and more,
the probability Ω exceeds 0.8. (Note that most Facebook users have more
than 200 friends [19].) From Eqns. (1) and (2) it is clear that Ω depends
strongly on AUj . For instance, our most popular app TripAdvisor
5 has
approximately 1·107 MAU (i.e., AUj ≈ 1·107); assuming that on average
a user has 200 friends [19] (i.e., |Fu| ≈ 200). Considering F = 1.1 · 109
(the population of Facebook) we estimate that the probability of at least
one of u’s friends installing TripAdvisor is larger than 78% (Ω ≥ 0.78).
Case study 2 – non-uniform distribution. Realistic social networks
do not conform to the uniformity assumption. Network degree has been
reported to follow a power law [14, 23] and the clustering coefficient has
been found to be much higher than in random networks [14]. Moreover,
5 https://www.facebook.com/games/tripadvisor.
Fig. 3: Likelihood of collateral information collection based on a. real data [5]
(left, per MAU) and b. simulations (right, with k = 10, 000 and d = 30).
app adoption has been proclaimed to be affected by different signals [15].
We have resorted to simulations in order to introduce these factors into
the estimation of the probability Ω.
Our simulations generate synthetic networks to compute Ω. Regarding
the friendship network, we have considered three different, well-known
models: Baraba´si-Albert [4] (BA), Watts-Strogatz [22] (WS), and Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi [9] (ER). Regarding app adoption, two different models have been
implemented: uniform (unif), where all users install an app with the
same probability (that is, independently of installations by their friends);
and preferential (prop), where the probability of a user installing an app
is proportional to the number of its friends that have already installed
the app.
Regarding the simulations, for each of the configurations (pairs of net-
work and app adoption models), we have computed the probability Ω
for one of the user’s friends installing an app with respect to the fraction
of the users of the network that installed the app. To make the results
of different network models comparable, we fixed both the number of
nodes in the network, k, and the mean degree, d. Then, we tuned the
parameters of the models to achieve these properties.
We performed simulations for network sizes k ∈ [100, 10, 000] and mean
degree d ∈ [10, 60]. Due to space constraints we include the results of
just one set of simulations, but the conclusions we have drawn can be
extrapolated to the other tested settings. Fig. 3.b draws the probabilities
obtained from networks with k = 10, 000 and d = 30 (results averaged
over 100 simulations) and from the analytical uniform app adoption case.
Most of the configurations give probability values very close to those
obtained when using the formula; the three exceptions are: ba-unif,
ws-prop, and ba-prop. The Baraba´si-Albert model generates graphs with
a few very high degree nodes (hubs) and lots of low degree nodes. When
combining networks generated with the Baraba´si-Albert model with a
uniform app adoption model, the probability for a hub to install an app
is the same as for any other node. To the contrary, when combining BA
with the prop app adoption model, hubs have a higher probability of
installing the app than non-hubs, since having a higher degree makes
them more likely to have (more) friends with the app installed. As a
consequence, each installation affects, in mean, more users, and thus
Ω increases. Concerning ws-prop, the Watts-Strogatz model generates
very clustered networks;6 when an app is installed by a member of a
community, it gets adopted by all other members easily. However, each
new installation inside the same community implies a small increase on
the overall Ω, because most of the users affected by the installation were
already affected by installations from other members of the community.
We observe that the probability computation (i.e., Ω) is conditioned
on both the network and app adoption models. However, we found that
there is a significant probability for a user’s friend to install an app which
enables collateral information collection for different networks and app
adoption models.
4 Significance of Collateral Information
Collection
In this section, we develop a mathematical model and compute the vol-
ume of the user’s attributes that can be collected by apps and appPs
when installed by the users’ friends. Our calculations are based on several
snapshots of the most popular apps on Facebook using the Appinspect
dataset [5].
Users and users’ friends. Each user ui in an OSN (i.e., ui ∈ F) has
a personal profile where each u can store, update, delete and administer
her personal data. A u’s profile consists of attributes ai such as name,
email, birthday and hometown. We denote the set of attributes of a u’s
profile as T and n as the size of T , i.e., T = {a1, . . . , an}. For instance,
Facebook currently operates with a set of n = 25 profile attributes. Let
Fu∗ be the union of u’s friends and the u itself and f∗ an element of Fu∗,
i.e., f∗ ∈ Fu∗. Clearly, Fu∗ = {u} ∪ Fu and Fu ∩ {u} = ∅, as u is not a
friend of u. For instance, Fu∗ = {u, f1, . . . , fk′} describes a user u and
its k′ friends, where 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k.
Applications and Application providers. Let L be the set of apps an
app provider (appP) can offer to every ui in an OSN and s the size of this
set, i.e., L = {A1, . . . , As}. Let Aj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, be the set of attributes
that each Aj can collect, i.e., Aj ⊆ T . Each Aj is owned and managed by
an appP denoted by Pj . The set of Ajs that belong to Pj it is denoted by
Pj , i.e., Pj ⊆ L. The set of all Pjs is denoted by AP and m the size of the
set, i.e., AP = {P1, . . . , Pm}. From our analysis we identified s = 16, 808
apps and m = 2055 appPs on Facebook indicating that a Pj can have
more than one Aj , i.e., Pj = {A1 . . . As′} with 1 ≤ s′ ≤ 160 [5].
4.1 Profiling
Application j. When Aj is activated by f
∗ (i.e., f∗ ∈ Fu∗), a set of
attributes ai can be collected from u’s profile. We denote by A
u,Fu∗
j an
Aj that users in F
u∗ installed and as Au,F
u∗
j the set of attributes ai that
Au,F
u∗
j can collect from u’s profile. Clearly, A
u,Fu∗
j ⊆ Aj ⊆ T . The set
of all Au,F
u∗
j s installed by the users in F
u∗ is denoted by Lu,F
u∗
. Clearly,
Lu,F
u∗ ⊆ L.
6 The expected clustering coeff. can be adjusted with the rewiring prob. parameter.
We denote by ~ai a vector of length n which corresponds to ai, i.e., ~ai =
[
1
0 . . . 0
i
10 . . .
n
0]. Moreover, we consider ~Au,F
u∗
j as a vector of length n,
which corresponds to Au,F
u∗
j , i.e.,
~Au,F
u∗
j =
∨
a∈Au,Fu∗j
~a ⇔ ~Au,Fu∗j [i] =
{
1 if ai ∈ Au,Fu∗j ,
0 if ai /∈ Au,Fu∗j ,
(3)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
Note that:
– x ∪ y =
{
z = 0 if x = y = 0,
z = 1 otherwise.
and ~x ∨ ~y = ~z where ~x[i] ∨ ~y[i] = ~z[i]
For instance, an Au,F
u∗
j = {a1, ai, an} is represented as ~Aj = ~a1∨~ai∨~an =
[
1
10 . . . 0
i
10 . . . 0
n
1]. It represents the attributes that can be collected by Aj
when is installed by f (i.e., the user’s friend).
Application provider j. Each appP consists of a set of Au,F
u∗
j s de-
noted by Pu,F
u∗
j which users in F
u∗ installed. Each Pu,F
u∗
j can collect
attributes of u’s profile. To identify which ais can be collected by Pj we
consider ~Pu,F
u∗
j as a vector of length n (i.e., n ∈ T ), which corresponds
to Pu,F
u∗
j , i.e.,
~Pu,F
u∗
j =
∨
A∈Pu,f∗j
f∗∈Fu∗
~Au,f
∗
=
∨
A∈Pu,Fu∗j
~Au,F
u∗
. (4)
Note that: ~Pu,F
u∗
j =
∨
f∗∈Fu∗
~Pu,f
∗
j = (
~Puj ∨ ~Pu,f1j ∨ · · · ∨ ~Pu,fij ), where
Fu∗ = {u, f1, . . . , fi} and ~Pu,u = ~Pu
The complexity of this operation for all f∗ in Fu∗ is O(n× |Pu,Fu∗j |).
4.2 Degree of collateral information collection
Friends f of u (f ∈ Fu) allow access to u’s profile by installing Ajs.
We denote by Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
the number of attributes that can be collected
by Aj exclusively from u’s friends (and not through the user herself,
i.e., u /∈ Fu) . Let ~Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
be a vector of length n which Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
provides, where n = |T |, where
~Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
= ~A′uj
∧
~Au,F
u
j . (5)
Note that: ~x′ ∧ ~x = [10 . . . n0] and ~x′ ∨ ~x = [11 . . . n1].
The complexity of this operation for all f∗ in Fu∗ is O(n4×|Auj |×|Au,F
u
j |).
Similarly, we denote by ~Πu
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
the number of attributes that can be
collected by Pj exclusively from u’s friends in F
u, i.e.,
~Πu
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
= ~P ′uj
∧
~Pu,F
u
j . (6)
4.3 The case of Facebook applications
To examine the problem, we extended our analysis for the apps (i.e., Ajs)
and appPs (i.e., Pjs) on Facebook using the Appinspect dataset [11,
5]. For each Aj , apart from the application name and id, the dataset
provides us with the requested permissions and the Ajs each Pj owns. We
computed the proportion of attributes an Aj and Pj can collect through:
1) the user’s friends and the user herself (i.e., profiling, Fu∗) and 2) only
the user’s friends (i.e., degree of collateral information collection, Fu).
From 16, 808 apps, 1202 enables collateral information collection. Our
analysis focuses on Ajs and Pjs that have more than 10, 000 MAU; there
are 207 and 88 respectively in each category.7
Profiling, Fu∗. Performing the analysis over the dataset, we found that
72.4% of Ajs and 62.5% of Pjs can collect one attribute from F
u∗. For
all Ajs and all Pjs, 48.6% and 28.7% of attributes which are considered
sensitive by the participants of our survey (such as photos, videos, lo-
cation and family-relationships) can be collected. Considering location
related attributes such as current location, hometown, work history and
education history, the proportion of attributes that can be collected are
23.5% from Ajs and 23.2% from Pjs.
Degree of collateral information collection, Fu. For Ajs installed
only by Fu, 28.9% of them show a degree of collateral information collec-
tion equal to 1; similarly, 36.3% of all Pjs. Moreover for F
u, we identified
that the proportion of sensitive attributes that can be collected from
Ajs and Pjs is 46.8% and 37%, respectively; while the proportion of col-
lectable location related attributes is 22.5% for Ajs and 36.9% for Pjs.
We conclude that the size of the two sets of sensitive attributes, collected
via profiling versus exclusively through friends, are both significant and,
surprisingly, comparable to each other. We also found that a considerable
amount of attributes concerning the user’s location can be collected by
either Ajs or Pjs.
5 Damage Control: Privacy Dashboard
Our survey results have shown that users from our survey are not only
concerned about the collateral information collection: they also want to
be notified and restrict access to their personal data on Facebook. They
also consider removing the apps that can cause collateral damage. The
need for transparency calls for a Transparency Enhancing Technology so-
lution, raising awareness of personal data collection and supporting the
users’ decision-making on the sharing of personal data [13, 1]. Hence, we
propose a dashboard that can help users to manage their privacy more
efficiently, and control the collateral information collection (see Fig. 4
for an initial user interface design). Technically speaking, the dashboard
illustrates how the user’s data disclosure takes place through the acquisi-
tion of the user’s personal data via apps (and respective appPs) installed
by their Facebook friends. It displays the nature and proportion of the
user’s personal data that can be collected by apps and, more importantly,
appPs.
7 http://iraklissymeonidis.info/Fb_apps_statistics/.
Fig. 4: Privacy dashboard: user interface concept
From our survey, we have concluded that Facebook users are more con-
cerned about certain types of personal information such as photos, videos,
location, and relationships. Our dashboard can accommodate the visual-
ization of profiling and the degree of collateral information collection by
assigning different weights to each attribute in the user’s profile. These
weights can be then manually fine-tuned by the user. Detailed design
and implementation of the dashboard remain the next step in our future
work. Additional information such as claimed purpose of collection by
the apps can be added in the dashboard. Moreover, further functional-
ity can be added to the dashboard such as leading the users from the
dashboard to uninstall the app (this would follow the European Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC [2]).
Finally, our survey shows that users also care about the damage that they
might cause to their friends by installing apps (bidirectional concern).
Complementing the privacy dashboard, we will also look into providing
transparency with an enriched app authorization dialogue at the time of
installation. Building on the basic design in [21], the enriched dialogue
will direct the attention of users to the existence and volume of collateral
damage to-be-inflicted on their friends.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a multi-faceted study concerning the col-
lateral damage caused by friends’ apps in social networking sites. Using
a user survey, mathematical modeling, and real data from Facebook, we
have demonstrated the importance and quantified the likelihood and sig-
nificance of such collateral information collection. Furthermore, to the
best of our knowledge, we have been first to report the potential user
profiling threat that could be achieved by application providers: they
can gain access to complementary subsets of user profile attributes by
offering multiple apps.
Our main findings are the following. First, our survey shows that the
vast majority of users are very concerned and would like proper notifi-
cation and control mechanisms regarding information collection by apps
installed by their friends. Also, they would potentially like to restrict
apps’ access to profile items both when their friends’ apps might collect
information about them and vice versa. As for future work, we are aim-
ing at conducting similar surveys among users of social platforms other
than Facebook, and extending the demographic range of participants.
We also intend to investigate the relevance of the users concerns and
demographic background, attribute values, and sensitivity to particular
contexts (e.g., via use cases).
Second, we have quantified the probability that a user is affected by the
collateral information collection by a friend’s app. Assuming a simple app
adoption model, an app with more than 500, 000 users may indirectly col-
lect information from the average user with 80% likelihood, irrespective
of the user itself having installed the app or not. Moreover, non-uniform
app adoption and network models also yield high likelihood. As future
work, we aim to extend our simulations regarding both network size and
realistic app adoption models.
Third, based on real data, we have quantified the significance of collat-
eral information collection by computing the proportion of attributes
collected by apps installed by the users’ friends. We have found that a
significant proportion of sensitive attributes, such as photos, videos, re-
lationships and location, can be collected from apps either by the user’s
friends and the user herself (i.e., 48.6%) or exclusively from the user’s
friends (i.e., 46.8%); surprisingly, these values are comparably high. Fur-
thermore, a considerable amount of location-related attributes can be
collected by both friends’ apps and profiling appPs. As a future work,
we aim to enrich our mathematical model by incorporating other param-
eters such as sensitivity.
Finally, we outline a conceptual design for a privacy dashboard which is
able to notify the user about the existence and extent of collateral dam-
age, and empower her to take restrictive actions if deemed necessary. We
also hint that an enriched app authorization dialogue would complement
the dashboard by providing estimates on potential damage to the user’s
friends at the time of installation. The detailed design and implemen-
tation of these solution concepts constitute important future work for
us.
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